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Abstract 
Secure management of Australia’s commercial critical infrastructure presents ongoing challenges to owners 
and the government. Although it is currently managed through high-level information sharing via collaboration, 
but does this suit the commercial sector. One of the issues facing Australia is that the majority of critical 
infrastructure resides under the control of the business sector and certain aspects such of the critical 
infrastructure such as Supply Chain Management (SCM) systems are distributed entities and not a single entity. 
The paper focuses upon the security issues associated with SCM systems and critical infrastructure protection. 
Keywords 
Critical infrastructure protection and Supply Change Management. 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the paper is to evaluate how Australia is protecting its NII (National Information Infrastructure) and 
CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) in terms of developing strategies and implementing national policies 
from a corporate viewpoint, NII (National Information Infrastructure) and its relationship with Supply Chain 
Management Systems (SCM). The NII runs the day-to-day life of Australians, operates gas and electricity 
supplies, banking and finance sectors, airports and transports, defence forces, telecommunications and 
government departments. 
A key factor is the concept of CII and how that relates to Australia/. CII is the subset of the NII that has a 
national importance. Many of these aspects are related to corporate organisations and as such government 
cannot have complete control and must instead try to influence corporations to correctly manage these aspects of 
the NII and CII. 
Within Australia, an annual national Computer Crime and Security Survey is undertaken to assess the sort of 
computer crime occurring within Australia. An earlier AusCERT survey (AusCERT, 2004) identified that 
organisational ignorance of criticality status could potentially undermine the reliability and security of 
Australia’s CII, as these organisations are utilising the NII without realising their risk liability. The latest 
AusCERT survey (AusCERT, 2006) showed that of the sample, only 34% of the organisations had indicated 
that they were part of the CII, which is a lower percentage that one would expect. Therefore organisational 
ignorance of criticality status could potentially undermine the reliability and security of Australia’s CII, as these 
organisations are utilising the NII without realising their risk liability. 
AUSTRALIA’S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Historically, much of Australia’s infrastructure was originally owned and operated by the public sector at the 
federal, state and local government levels (Smith, 2004). However the majority of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure has now been privatised and is under private sector ownership. Consequently, protecting 
Australia’s critical infrastructure now requires a high level of cooperation between all levels of government and 
the private sector owners. Hence, the federal government has developed a policy for critical infrastructure 
protection that focuses broadly on addressing the following strategies (Australian Government, 2004): 
 
Distinguishing critical infrastructures and ascertaining the areas risk; 
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Aligning the strategies for reducing potential risk to critical infrastructure; 
Encouraging and developing effective partnerships with state and territory governments and the private 
sector; 
Advancing both domestic and international best practice for critical infrastructure protection. 
The Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) is a forum in which the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure work together by sharing information on security issues which affect critical infrastructure (TISN, 
2007). TISN requires the active participation of CIP owners and operators of CIP infrastructure, regulators, 
professional bodies and industry associations, in cooperation with all levels of government, and the public. To 
ensure this cooperation and coordination, all  of these participants should commit to the following set of 
common fundamental principles of CIP (TISN, 2007). These principles are (TISN, 2007): 
1. CIP is centred on the need to minimise risks to public health, safety and confidence, ensure economic 
security, maintain Australia’s international competitiveness and ensure the continuity of government 
and its services. 
2. The objectives of CIP are to identify critical infrastructure, analyse vulnerability and 
interdependence, and protect from, and prepare for, all hazards. 
3. As not all critical infrastructure can be protected from all threats, appropriate risk management 
techniques should be used to determine relative severity and duration, the level of protective security, 
set priorities for the allocation of resources and the application of the best mitigation strategies for 
business continuity. 
4. The responsibility for managing risk within physical facilities, supply chains, information 
technologies and communication networks primarily rests with the owners and operators. 
5. CIP needs to be undertaken from an 'all hazards approach' with full consideration of 
interdependencies between businesses, sectors, jurisdictions and government agencies. 
6. CIP requires a consistent, cooperative partnership between the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure and governments. 
7. The sharing of information relating to threats and vulnerabilities will assist governments, and owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure to better manage risk. 
8. Care should be taken when referring to national security threats to critical infrastructure, including 
terrorism, so as to avoid undue concern in the Australian domestic community, as well as potential 
tourists and investors overseas. 
9. Stronger research and analysis capabilities can ensure that risk mitigation strategies are tailored to 
Australia’s unique critical infrastructure circumstances. 
The Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group (the Food Chain Group) forms part of the TISN. The primary aim 
of the Food Chain Group has been to improve the security of the agriculture and food supply chain in the 
changed global security environment. The existing food safety and security systems and food regulatory 
arrangements are primarily aimed at preventing and detecting natural or accidental risks. The new challenge is to 
ensure these systems are now capable of responding to the new increased potential for acts of deliberate and 
malicious intervention (FCIAAG, 2007). 
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) involve the flows of material, information and finance in a network 
consisting of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors and customers (Lee, 2000) and is one area that can be 
effectively adapted to eBusiness, especially if the Internet is used for the exchange of business information 
(Lucian et al, 2002).  
 
SCM is defined by the Global Supply Chain Forum (Lambert and Cooper, 2000) as the integration of key 
business processes from end user through original suppliers that provides products, services and information that 
add value for stakeholders. Cooper et al (1997) argue that the supply chain management evolves through several 
stages of increasing intra- and inter-organizational integration and coordination. In a very broad sense and 
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implementation, it spans the entire chain from initial source (supplier's supplier, etc) to ultimate consumer 
(customer's customer, etc.). 
 
As SCM technologies have developed in complexity, so to have the risks that are posed to the businesses that 
employ them (Vasiu et al, 2002). Smith et al (2002) intimate some of main risks that businesses are exposed to 
when doing business on the Internet: 
 
• Current software engineering techniques do not produce systems that are immune to attack; 
 
• Organisations do not have the expertise to defend their systems against attack; 
 
• Cyberspace legislation lags behind current attack trends; 
 
• Little evidence to suggest improved security since organisations are continually playing ‘catch-up’ with 
routinely discovered vulnerabilities; 
 
• Current security tools only address piecemeal technical aspects of security whereas information 
security is a holistic issue; and, 
 
• System administration is difficult to manage due to continuous system patching. 
 
The attraction of utilising the convenience of the Internet for communication interconnectivity between SCM 
partners can expose these businesses to security risks and vulnerabilities that if breached, will compromise the 
security of the entire SCM, thus placing other businesses involved with the SCM are at risk. 
 
SUPPLY CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND PRIOR SECURITY RESEARCH 
In terms of SCM security there has been prior research undertaken by the research team in relation to SCM and 
electronic fraud. This research is important because the security risks associated with CIP SCM cannot be 
considered in isolation. If a key SCM system is compromised by traditional fraud then the impact could have a 
national impact and could also be an indicated of more serious security issues associated with that SCM 
 
It is extremely difficult to put hard figures on the incidence of SCM electronic fraud. The explanations are lack 
of awareness that fraud has occurred and under-reporting. The last one is due to fear of loss of goodwill (Vasiu 
et al, 2002), pessimism regarding the apprehension of attackers, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of previous 
criminal proceedings and a common preference to take administrative action and attempt to recover losses 
without criminal charges .  
 
Benbow (1992) identifies five types of fraudsters:  
 
• the opportunist: having the ability and knowledge to manipulate accounts; 
 
• the habitual claimant: using many different names to commit fraud time and time again; 
 
• the patient claimant: perpetrating the same fraud time and time again; 
 
• the providers: volumes of fraudulent transactions by providers can easily be committed; and 
 
• the organized gang: large organized gangs running complex frauds. 
 
According to Di Nicola and Scartezzini (2000), the more complex the context in which fraudsters operate, the 
more professional experience they require and the broader organizational structures they need in order to 
commit their crimes. Large-scale crimes need organization to better achieve results and to reduce risks. 
Criminals need detailed information on techniques and practices in order to assess opportunities and risk. 
 
The three electronic fraud methods are: 
 
 Input (“data diddling” or “number fudging”): the fraudster dishonestly enters false data, suppresses, or 
amends data as entered (a variant on common false accounting). It is the most common computer crime 
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(Vasiu et al, 2002) and can be committed by anyone having access to normal data-processing functions 
at the input stage.  
 
 Program: this involves either the creation of a program with a view to fraud or the alteration or amendment 
of a program to such ends. It is very difficult to discover and is frequently not recognized (Vasiu et al, 
2002)). It requires computer-specific knowledge and high level access to computer databases and/or 
software (Vasiu et al, 2002), and for this reason, it is usually associated with insiders.  
 
 Output: the fraudster dishonestly suppresses or amends data being output—very often linked with input 
fraud (e.g. suppressing or changing balance reports to hide misappropriated funds). The goal with this 
type of scheme is to conceal bogus inputs and also to prevent or postpone detection of such input fraud 
(Vasiu et al, 2002). This type of fraud is relatively unsophisticated and is concerned with the end 
product; because computer output is normally accepted as being accurate and genuine its authenticity is 
taken for granted. 
 
The greatest concern present the frauds that involve manipulation of data records or computer programs to 
disguise the true nature of transactions, cracking into an organization’s computer system to manipulate business 
information and unauthorized transfers of funds electronically  
 
Based upon the research a conceptual framework (Vasiu et al, 2002) was developed that described the issues of 
electronic fraud within SCM, this is shown by figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of electronic Fraud within SCM 
SCM CASE STUDIES 
The following actual real life examples show the impact that failures within Australian SCM systems have had. 
The examples focus upon the state of Victoria, Australia. 
 
 
 
 
Car Industry 
 
The automotive industry is one of Australia’s key manufacturing sectors and an important source of 
employment, and research and development. The increasing exposure of the Australian automotive 
industry to international competition has seen it develop to where it is now competing successfully in 
global markets. There is also a strong inter-dependence between the car makers and their suppliers, and 
strong linkages with the rest of the economy (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005). 
 
In August, 2007, 200 workers from Melbourne based plastic parts supplier Venture went on strike in 
regards to $25 million in redundancy entitlements. They supplied the Australian Car Industry will many 
of the parts used in the car manufacturing process. As a consequence of the strike, 1850 assembly line 
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and engine workers at Ford's Victorian plants in Broadmeadows and Geelong were stood down without 
pay and all manufacting at those plants ceased (Herald Sun, 2007a; News.Com.AU, 2007). 
 
The actions of a single car parts supplier caused all car manufacturing within the state of Victoria to 
cease for several weeks. 
 
Power Supply 
On 16th January, 2007, 4pm a power blackout impacted Victoria and left 200,0000 homes and 
businesses without electricity as well as disrupting Melbourne's public transport system and road 
network.  
A bushfire at Benalla burnt a main power line cable between Victoria and New South Wales. The black 
out caused about 1,200 traffic signals across the Melbourne and Geelong metropolitan area to fail and 
the power failure interrupted the metropralition train systems within Victoria. SP AusNet eventually 
restored power to the Victorian - New South Wales interconnector powerline on the 17th January at 
12:30 a.m. (Herald Sun, 2007b; The Age, 2007).  
This examples shows how a failure of a critical service such as power can completelty disrupte the 
operation of a SCM. 
RESEARCH FOCUS 
The initial description of the research within the paper is the start of a new research project. The research will 
focus upon: 
 
• identification of commercial critical systems within Australia and also other countries that have defined 
critical infrastructure systems; 
• analysis of open source intelligence to identify security threats and risks that have occurred against 
commercial critical systems, e.g. potential security risks and threats that complex SCM systems could 
face; 
• review of existing security approaches applied to SCM systems and whether they can be applied to 
protecting more generic commercial critical systems linked to critical infrastructure; 
• review of traditional security risk analysis approaches to identify how traditional approaches could deal 
with complex security issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The security of the any SCM is only as strong as its weakest link and therefore it is incumbent upon the 
individual organisational partners that make up the SCM to be proactive in continuously improving their 
security measures and policies in order to effectively protect or indeed pre-empt any likely damage resulting 
from possible threats and vulnerabilities and their subsequent adverse effects on the functionality of the SCM. 
The issue with critical SCMs is any failure will not just impact the SCM partners but could have the possibility 
of impacting entire industrial sectors or impacting Australia as a whole. 
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